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COMMENTS
Business Owners' Duty to Protect Patrons From the Criminal
Acts of Third Parties in Louisiana
INTRODUCTION
The prevalence of crime in American society tops the list of the country's most
pressing domestic problems.' Louisianajoins the rest of the nation in experiencing
its fair share of crime.2 The pervasiveness of the crime problem and public law
enforcement's inability to control it suggest that other segments of society need to
contribute their efforts to combat crime.
Business establishments constitute a particular source of crime victimization,
and consequently business patrons3 face a high risk of criminal assaults.4 Courts
and legislatures could help remedy the situation by using tort law to impose a duty
on the business owner to take precautionary measures against crime.5 One of the
Copyright 1993, by LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW.
1. Each year the Federal Bureau of Investigation publishes the Uniform Crime Reports for the
United States. The report contains the amount of crime that is officially noted by the police
throughout the nation. During 1991, nearly fifteen million offenses were reported to law
enforcement. Federal Bureau of Investigation, U. S. Dep't of Justice, Uniform Crime Reports for the
United States 1991, 6 (1992) [hereinafter FBI Crime Reports). The violent crimes total which
includes the offenses of murder, non-negligent manslaughter, forcible rape, robbery, and aggravated
assault exceeded 1.9 million offenses, up five percent from 1990 and the highest annual total ever
recorded. Id. at 11. In a special report of the trends in violent crime, the Bureau of Justice Statistics
determined that the chance of being a victim of a violent crime is greater than that of being hurt in
a traffic accident. Bureau of Justice Statistics, U. S. Dep't of Justice, Violent Crime in the United
States 2 (1991).
2. There were 273.170 offenses reported in Louisiana in 1991. Although the total number of
crimes reported decreased by two-tenths of one percent, the number of violent crimes reported
increased by nearly seven percent. FBI Crime Reports, supra note 1, at 64.
3. "Patron" means anyone entering the premises of a business establishment. The common
law classifications of invitee, trespasser, and licensee are inappropriate in Louisiana. See Cates v.
Beauregard Electric Coop., Inc., 328 So. 2d 367, 370-71 (La. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 833, 97
S. Ct. 97 (1976). But cf Entrevia v. Hood, 427 So. 2d 1146 (La. 1983) (considering status as a
relevant concern).
4. Michael J. Bazyler, The Duty to Provide Adequate Protection: Landowners' Liability for
Failure to Protect Patrons from Criminal Attack, 21 Ariz. L. Rev. 727, 728 (1979). The author
provides a compilation of crime statistics illustrating the severity of the crime problem at commercial
establishments.
This comment focuses on the personal crimes which comprise the violent crimes category of the
FBI Crime Reports rather than on property crimes because the most serious aspect of the crime
problem at business establishments is the risk of personal injury or death to the patron.
5. Imposing a duty on the business owner has been advocated by various commentators. See
id.; see also Michael J. Yelnosky, Comment, Business Inviters' Duty to Protect Invitees from
Criminal Acts, 134 U. Pa. L. Rev. 883 (1986).
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purposes of tort law is the deterrence of socially undesirable behavior.6 One way
to deter crime is to encourage business owners to make their establishments less
inviting to criminals through such measures as adequate lighting, design, security
systems, and security guards.'
Some courts have recognized the severity of the crime problem and the role
that business owners can play in deterring crime. For example, the California
Supreme Court in Isaacs v. Huntington Memorial Hospitals determined the duty
of the defendant hospital with respect to third party criminal acts by considering the
nature, condition, location, and past experience of the hospital.9 A duty analysis
based on these factors allows courts to ask such questions as: What type of
business establishment was involved? Was the business located in a high crime
area? Was the lighting inadequate? Were there any security measures in place,
such as fencing off or a security guard or system? Did any prior crimes occur on
the premises giving notice to the business owner of the dangers facing his
patrons? 0 By analyzing the duty in this way, courts can particularize the business
owner's duty to exercise reasonable care in criminal acts cases and encourage him
to take a variety of precautionary measures that could make his premises less
inviting to criminals."1
In contrast, Louisiana courts analyze the business owner's duty insufficiently
in that they fail to consider the above factors in criminal acts cases. The courts
maintain that the business owner has a duty to exercise reasonable care under the
circumstances; however, his duty to protect patrons from the criminal acts of third
parties only extends to those acts which are foreseeable.1 2 At first glance, this
approach would seem to allow for a consideration of any factor which makes a
crime more likely. Conceivably, foreseeability should include looking at the nature,
condition, location, and past experience of a business establishment. However, the
overwhelming majority of Louisiana courts define foreseeabilit.y narrowly in either
of two ways: (1) a crime is foreseeable if the business owner knows or should know
that it is about to occur (the "impending assault" doctrine), 3 or (2) a crime is
A business owner is a person who owns and/or occupies land for a business purpose and holds it
open to the public.
6. William L. Prosser et al., Cases and Materials on Torts 1 (8th ed. 1988).
7. See Laura D. Kulwicki, Comment, A Landowner's Duty to Guard Against Criminal Attack:
Foreseeability and the Prior Similar Incidents Rule, 48 Ohio St. L.J. 247, 263 (1987); George B.
South, Note, The Duty to Protect Customers from Criminal Acts Occurring Off the Premises: The
Watering-Down of the "Prior Similar Incidents" Rule, 19 Hofstra L. Rev. 1271, 1276-77 (1991).
8. 695 P.2d 653 (Cal. 1985).
9. Id. at 661.
10. See id. at 653-63.
11. The analysis encourages the business owner to adopt precautionary measures in that it
increases his duty to exercise reasonable care. Business owners will have an incentive to adopt
preventive measures in order to avoid liability arising out of this higher duty.
12. Davenport v. Nixon, 434 So, 2d 1203, 1205 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1983).
13. Cases which feature the "impending assault" doctrine include: Rodriguez v. NOPSI, 400
So. 2d 884, 887 (La. 1981); Johnston v. Fontana, 610 So. 2d 1119, 1121 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1992);
Harrison v. Clark, 607 So. 2d 1, 2 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1992); Potter v. First Federal Say. & Loan Ass'n
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foreseeable if the business owner knows a high number of prior similar incidents
have occurred on the business premises (the "prior crimes" rule). 4 As a result,
the business owner's duty to protect patrons from the criminal acts of third parties
in Louisiana is very limited. The business owner is called to react to a specific
crime in progress or to take precautionary measures only after the business has
encountered a high number of prior criminal acts.' 5 Thus, by restricting their
analyses to two definitions of foreseeability, Louisiana courts do little to encourage
the business owner to take precautionary measures against crime. 16
The second flaw in the courts' analyses is their failure to consider the policies
inherent in the duty/risk analysis which the Louisiana Supreme Court adopted in
Hill v. Lundin."7 When the supreme court adopted the duty/risk approach, it
conveyed to the Louisiana courts that they should always consider a variety of
socio-economic factors when determining duty in a negligence case. 8 For
example, the courts should address whether imposing a duty on the business owner
would open the floodgates to unmanageable litigation; whether the patron's
damages are easily associated with the business owner's conduct; whether the
business owner is better able to bear the loss than the patron; whether it seems
morally appropriate to impose a duty on the business owner; whether the
of Scotlandville, 602 So. 2d 1070, 1073 n.3 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1992), vacated, 615 So. 2d 318
(1993); Owens v. Regional Transit Auth., 559 So. 2d 870, 871 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1990); Coblentz
v. North Peters Parking, Inc., 533 So. 2d 98, 101 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1988); Delgado v. Laboucherie,
Inc., 508 So. 2d 956, 958 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1987); Toups v. Hawkins, 518 So. 2d 1077, 1081 (La.
App. 5th Cir. 1987); Ballew v. Southland Corp., 482 So. 2d 890, 893 n.1 (La. App, 2d Cir. 1986);
Crochet v. Hospital Serv. Dist. No. I of Terrebonne Parish, 476 So. 2d 516, 517 (La. App. 1st Cir.),
writ denied, 478 So. 2d 1235 (1985); Davenport v. Nixon, 434 So. 2d 1203, 1205 (La. App. 1st Cir.
1983); Pinkney v. Miller, 439 So. 2d 1113, 1117 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1983), writ denied, 444 So. 2d
117, reconsideration denied, 445 So. 2d 443 (1984).
14. Cases which feature a "prior crimes" rule include: Harris v. Pizza Hut, 455 So. 2d 1364,
1371 (La. 1984); Mundy v. Department of Health & Human Resources, 609 So. 2d 909, 915 (La.
App. 4th Cir. 1992), aft'd, 620 So. 2d 811 (1993); Russell v. McDonald's Corp., 576 So. 2d 1213,
1215-16 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1991); Smith v. Walgreens Louisiana Co,, Inc., 542 So. 2d 766, 767-68
(La. App. 4th Cir. 1989); Sutter v. Audubon Park Comm'n, 533 So. 2d 1226, 1232-33 (La. App. 4th
Cir. 1988), writ denied, 538 So. 2d 597 (1989); Foster v. Colonel Sanders Kentucky Fried Chicken,
Inc., 526 So. 2d 252, 256-58 (La. App. 2d Cir.), writ denied, 531 So. 2d 483 (1988); Landry v. St.
Charles Inn, Inc., 446 So. 2d 1246, 1249 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1984); Miles v. Flor-Line Assocs., 442
So. 2d 584, 586 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1983); Pennington v. Church's Fried Chicken, Inc., 393 So. 2d
360, 361-62 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1980); Roberts v. Tiny Tim Thrifty Check, 367 So. 2d 64, 65 (La.
App. 4th Cir. 1979).
15. The business owner is required to react to an "impending assault" as outlined in Rodriguez
v. NOPSI, 400 So. 2d 884, 887 (La. 1981). He also may be required to take crime preventive
measures if a high number of crimes occurs on the premises. Foster v. Colonel Sanders Kentucky
Fried Chicken, Inc., 526 So. 2d 252, 258 n.2 (La. App. 2d Cir.), writ denied, 531 So. 2d 483 (1988)
(stating that four crimes may be enough to create a duty to take deterrent measures).
16. In Part 111, this comment discusses the negative effects of using narrow approaches to
foreseeability in the duty determination.
17. 260 La. 542, 256 So. 2d 620 (La. 1972).
18. See generally David W. Robertson, Reason Versus Rule in Louisiana Tort Law: Dialogues
on Hill v. Lundin & Associates, Inc., 34 La. L. Rev. 1 (1973).
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jurisprudence paves the way for the business owner's duty to take precautionary
measures; and whether societal views call the courts to impose a duty in this area
of tort law.' 9 Presently, the courts fail to address these issues in determining the
business owner's duty and are instead guided in their analyses by a narrow
approach to foreseeability. 20 If the courts were to look closely at the duty/risk
factors suggested in Hill, they would discover (as this comment will illustrate in
Part III) that these factors support a more demanding duty for the business owner
to take precautionary measures against crime.
This comment proposes that Louisiana courts abandon their traditional
approaches to the business owner's duty to protect patrons from the criminal acts
of third parties and adopt an approach which allows them to consider factors, in
addition to the duty/risk factors, which are specifically relevant in criminal acts
cases. By adopting such an approach, Louisiana courts can impose a duty upon the
business owner not only to react to a specific crime in progress or to take
precautionary measures after a high number of crimes have occurred on the
premises, but also to adopt precautionary measures according to the nature,
condition, location, and past experience of the business establishment. 2,
To understand the need for a more demanding approach, Part I of this comment
discusses the severity of the crime problem and how business owners can play a
vital role in decreasing crime. Part II discusses Louisiana law as it now stands and
illustrates the confusion which has resulted from the courts' use of two definitions
of foreseeability. Part III analyzes and criticizes the present approaches taken by
the various courts. Part IV proposes an approach which is sensitive to the factors
which facilitate crime on business premises and maintains that Louisiana statutes
and jurisprudence provide support for a court willing to adopt the proposal.
I. WHY THE BUSINESS OWNER?
Louisiana business owners may respond to a higher duty imposed by the courts
by asking why they, rather than law enforcement, should be responsible for
protecting patrons by taking precautionary measures. There are several reasons
why courts should impose a legal duty on business owners. The most overwhelming
reason is that the threat of crime has reached incredible proportions and has become
a fact of life for most Americans.2 2 In the past, people in the cities were the only
ones forced to worry about crime, but since 1969, suburbs, small towns, and rural
areas have experienced high increases in crime rates. Victimization surveys and
19. Professor Crowe has labeled these questions as the administrative, ease of association,
economic, moral, and historical or precedent factors. William L. Crowe, Sr., The Anatomy of a
Tort-Greenian, As Interpreted by Crowe Who Has Been Influenced by Malone-A Primer, 22 Loy.
L. Rev. 903, 906-09 (1976).
20. See supra notes 13-14 and accompanying text.
21. For an example of this approach, see lsaacs v. Huntington Memorial Hosp., 695 P.2d 653
(Cal. 1985). For an evaluation of the Isaacs approach, see Kulwicki, supra note 7, at 256-71.
22. Supra notes 1-2.
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public opinion polls show that the fear of crime pervades American society.23 As
mentioned, commercial establishments constitute a particular source of criminal
victimization. Criminal activity at commercial establishments is the highest at
retail stores and proprietary parking structures.24 Tort law could possibly help
remedy the situation by imposing a duty on business owners to adopt crime
prevention measures in the hopes of decreasing the crime rate at business
establishments.25
Proponents of the market theory maintain that a legal duty imposed on the
business owner is unwarranted. They argue that customers may always refuse to
shop at establishments which pose a particularly apparent risk of criminal attack.
The argument follows that fewer customers will patronize those establishments
resulting in a decline in business. To compensate for this decline in business,
business owners will charge higher prices, and as prices increase, the demand for
goods will decrease. As a result, businesses will be forced to adopt precautionary
measures or eventually will go out of business. Thus, the market theory suggests
that a tort duty is unnecessary because business owners already have an incentive
to adopt precautionary measures in accordance with their self-interest.26
The market theory is flawed, however, because it assumes that patrons have
adequate information about the dangers presented by a particular business
establishment. Patrons are more likely to be uninformed about the extent of the
crime problem. Local patrons will most likely possess only a general awareness of
the dangerous conditions, and the occasional customer unfamiliar with the area may
be completely ignorant of the crime problem.27 Certainly, the market does
nothing to encourage businesses to provide customers with this information.
More importantly, common experience demonstrates that the very generalized
economic incentives espoused by the market theorists are not enough to encourage
efficient crime prevention. Business owners in general have been unresponsive
to the dangers their establishments pose and have contributed to the crime problem
because their inadequate security measures facilitate criminal attacks; "Considered
as a group, commercial establishments have inadequate gate and guard service, lack
proper anti-theft devices and fail to provide proper lighting to protect themselves
and their patrons .. 29 Because the business owner in many instances creates
23. Yelnosky, supra note 5, at 885-86 and sources cited therein.
24. See Bazyler, supra note 4 and accompanying text. In 1990, almost nine percent of violent
crimes occurred in a parking lot or garage. Bureau of Justice Statistics, U.S. Dep't of Justice,
Criminal Victimization in the United States, 1990, 67 (1992).
25. See Uri Kaufman, When Crime Pays: Business Landlords' Duty to Protect Customers From
Criminal Acts Committed on the Premises, 31 S. Tex. L. Rev. 89, II1 (1990) ("While crime
prevention has traditionally been a government function, it is both unwise and wasteful to let
preventable crimes occur simply because the common law did not require businessmen to take
preventive measures.").
26. Kulwicki, supra note 7, at 264.
27. Id. at 265.
28. Kaufman, supra note 25, at I10-11.
29. Bazyler, supra note 4, at 730.
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opportunities for criminal activity on his premises, he should then be responsible
for eliminating those opportunities.
Imposing a duty on business owners also furthers the tort law purposes of
deterring socially undesirable behavior, compensating injured parties, and
spreading risks.30 The business owner's duty to adopt precautionary measures
will result in deterring criminal behavior because the premises will be less inviting
to criminals." Another benefit of the higher duty is that those who do fall victim
to crime will have better chances of compensation as the business owner will have
to meet higher standards of crime prevention.32 As a result of the tougher
standards, victims are more likely to receive compensation.
Finally, this higher duty is fair to the business owner because he can pass the
costs of security measures on to the patrons through higher prices in the goods and
services he offers.3 Therefore, the business owner is not the only one paying for
the crime problem.3 4 Another fairness factor is that the business owner is in a
better position than his customers to prevent crime on his premises. The business
owner is better able to assess the crime problem in the area and determine which
security devices should be utilized. For instance, he might know the details of
crimes which have occurred and the specific measures necessary to prevent their
reoccurrence. 3 In addition, the business owner will benefit from the higher duty
because his business will be less inviting to criminals while at the same time more
attractive to patrons. Thus, the business owner should experience an increase in
business as a result of the higher duty.
Courts can ensure that this higher duty does not create the potential for
unlimited liability by controlling lawsuits through the duty determination
process.36 By using the duty/risk approach plus the factors proposed in Part IV,
courts can prevent business owners from becoming subject to unlimited liability.
Thus, the business owner's duty to adopt crime prevention measures could help
reduce the crime rate, furthers the purposes of tort law, and is fair to the business
owner. Louisiana courts have been slow to recognize the benefits of imposing such
a duty. The jurisprudence reveals that a narrow standard of foreseeability has
30. Prosser et al., supra note 6, at 1-2.
31. South, supra note 7, at 1276-77.
32. This comment's proposed approach allows courts to consider a variety of factors to
determine the business owner's duty. As a result, crime victims will have more avenues to pursue
to obtain compensation.
33. Kulwicki, supra note 7, at 265.
34. Id. Passing the costs on to the patron could have devastating effects on the patrons and
businesses of high crime areas. These patrons are typically least able to afford the higher cost.
Consequently, the business establishments in those areas will experience a decrease in sales and
ultimately may be forced out of business. As a possible solution to this problem, public law
enforcement should increase their presence in those areas. Id. at 266.
35. Kaufman, supra note 25, at 114.
36. As Professor Leonard writes, "[Tlhe duty concept serves as a filtering tool in the hands of
the court." David P. Leonard, The Good Samaritan Rule as a Procedural Control Device: Is It
Worth Saving?, 19 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 807. 817 (1986).
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constrained the courts in their analyses of the business owner's duty. As a result,
the courts' rulings provide little incentive for the business owner to take precaution-
ary measures to protect his patrons from crime."
II. JURISPRUDENCE
The following survey organizes the jurisprudence involving the business
owner's duty to protect patrons around the leading cases of Banks v. Hyatt
Corporation38 and Harris v. Pizza Hut of Louisiana, Inc.,39 both of which were
decided in 1984. Banks and the cases before it employed an "impending assault"
definition of foreseeability in determining the business owner's duty. That is, those
cases only required the business owner to react to a specific crime that he knew or
should have known was about to occur.4
Harris appeared to impose a higher duty on the business owner by using a
"prior crimes" rule to analyze duty.4 ' This rule requires the business owner to
take precautionary measures after a high number of incidents have occurred on the
business premises. 42 However, as will be more fully explained, the Harris opinion
caused confusion in the lower courts about how the business owner's duty was to
be determined. 43 As a result, some courts continued to use the pre-Harris
"impending assault" doctrine, others used a "prior crimes" rule, and still others used
a combination of the two. 44 Meanwhile, three cases departed from the narrow
foreseeability approaches of Banks and Harris and analyzed the duty by consider-
ing factors similar to those proposed by this comment.43
The law as it stands today is inconsistent because it imposes several different
duties on the business owner. The confusion in the law stems from the tendency
of some courts to continue using the narrow duty analysis of the pre-Harris cases
while others try to expand the factors in the duty determination. Another reason for
the confusion is that the Louisiana Supreme Court has shown a general reluctance
37. The business owner has little legal incentive to adopt precautionary measures (except under
a prior crimes rule) because the present law does not require him to do so.
38. 722 F.2d 214 (5th Cir. 1984).
39. 455 So. 2d 1364 (La. 1984).
40. Banks, 722 F.2d at 220. For more examples of "impending assault" cases, see supra note
13.
41. Harris, 455 So. 2d at 1371. By stating that "it is unnecessary to decide how many prior
criminal acts create a duty to hire a private guard," the court assumed that the business owner's duty
should be determined using a "prior crimes" rule.
42. See Smith v. Walgreens Louisiana Co., Inc., 542 So. 2d 766, 768 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1989)
(stating that a high number of prior similar incidents is necessary to trigger the business owner's duty
to protect).
43. See infra text accompanying notes 84-94.
44. See infra text accompanying notes 98-113.
45. See Willie v. American Casualty Co., 547 So. 2d 1075 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1989). writ
denied, 584 So. 2d 678 (1991); Phillips v. Equitable Life Assurance Co. of the United States, 413
So. 2d 696 (La. App. 4th Cir.), writ denied, 420 So. 2d 164 (1982); and Day v. Castilow, 407 So.
2d 510 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1981).
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to address this very important issue and on numerous occasions has avoided setting
any clear standards for the lower courts to follow.46
The following discussion of the caselaw is meant to shed some light on these
problems by first discussing the criminal acts cases before Banks and Harris,
examining Banks and Harris in detail, and finally illustrating the present confusion
plaguing the courts' analyses today.
A. Before Banks and Harris
The jurisprudence before Banks and Harris regarding the business owner's
duty is best reflected in dicta found in cases involving the common carrier's and
innkeeper's duties to protect patrons from the criminal acts of third parties.4 7 For
instance, in Rodriguez v. New Orleans Public Service, Inc.,48 the Louisiana
Supreme Court held that NOPSI, a common carrier, should be held to the same duty
as a reasonable business establishment with respect to criminal acts of third parties.
The court explained:
When the independent, intentional tortious or criminal acts of a third
person constitute the unreasonable risk, this duty does not require the
proprietor to risk physical injury or civil or criminal liability by physical
intervention. Rather, the duty can be discharged by the'summoning of
those entrusted by law with the power of immediately maintaining the
peace, the police, at the time the proprietor knows or should reasonably
know of the third person's intention and apparent ability to execute the
intended acts.49
The plaintiff in the case argued that NOPSI breached its duty of care when its
motorman failed to do anything between the time another passenger began insulting
the plaintiff's son and the time the other passenger attacked the son. The court
found NOPSI not liable because the record did not show that the motorman should
have known the attack would occur."
Thus, in the process of establishing the common carrier's duty, the court in
Rodriguez clearly stated the business owner's duty when faced with an "impending
assault." The business owner can discharge his duty by calling the police at the
time he knows or should know the crime is about to occur.5 The following cases
46. See infra text accompanying notes 166-76.
47. Although common carriers and innkeepers are both business owners in that they operate
a business for profit open to the public, the courts traditionally have placed them in separate
categories. This comment's proposed duty is meant to apply to all types of business owners.
Therefore, the traditional categories of innkeeper, common carrier, and commercial business inviter
should be abandoned.
48. 400 So. 2d 884 (La. 1981).
49. Id. at 887 (citations omitted).
50. Id. at 886-88.
51. Id. at 887.
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contrast the business owner's duty with that of the innkeeper, and, as a result, they
more fully develop the business owner's duty and the "impending assault" doctrine.
In Davenport v. Nixon,52 the first circuit court of appeal found a motel liable
for the negligence of the motel operator, who did nothing after a guest informed her
that a suspicious man had approached him. Later, the same man assaulted the guest
in the parking lot.53 The court first discussed the duty of a business owner, stating
that a business owner's duty to protect patrons did not extend to the unforeseeable
or unanticipated criminal acts of an independent third person:
Only when the owner or management of a business has knowledge, or can
be imputed with knowledge, of a third person's intended criminal conduct
which is about to occur, and which is within the power of the owner or
management to protect against, does such a duty of care towards a guest
arise.5
Davenport thus added the foreseeability factor to the business owner's duty. His
duty extends to those criminal acts which are foreseeable, and foreseeable acts are
those which are impending or imminent. Once an act is impending, the business
owner has a duty to react as described in Rodriguez.
In contrast, the innkeeper has a higher duty than the business owner with
respect to the criminal acts of third parties, In Kraaz v. La Quinta Motor Inns,
Inc.," two robbers obtained a pass key to motel rooms from the desk clerk by
claiming to be guests. The robbers used the key to enter the Kraazs' room, then
robbed and assaulted the couple. The court affirmed the lower court's judgment in
favor of the plaintiffs. In determining the duty of the motel, the Louisiana Supreme
Court recognized that a guest is entitled to a high degree of care and protection.
More importantly, it defined this higher degree of care as the "duty to take
reasonable precautions against criminals. 56
Therefore, the innkeeper has a duty to prepare for the criminal acts of third
parties, while the business owner must only react to a specific crime in progress.
The Kraaz court did not provide any factors which a court should consider in
determining the innkeeper's duty to take precautions. However, the Banks court
later would use a "prior crimes" standard of foreseeability for the innkeeper.57
Thus, before Banks and Harris, there were two different duties with two
different standards for the courts to apply: a high duty for the innkeeper and a
limited duty for the business owner. However, the following cases illustrate that
one court imposed a more demanding duty than both of these on the business
owner.
52. 434 So. 2d 1203 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1983).
53. Id. at 1204-05.
54. Id. at 1205 (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
55. 410 So. 2d 1048 (La. 1982).
56. Id. at 1050-53 (emphasis added).
57. See infra text accompanying notes 67-79.
1993] 1855
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
B. A Third Approach?
The fourth circuit court of appeal departed from the "impending assault"
standard for the business owner and concentrated on other specific relevant factors
in Day v. Castilows8 and Phillips v. Equitable Life Assurance Co. of the United
States. 9 The court analyzed the business owner's duty by considering factors
which would make the business establishment more inviting to criminals.' As
more fully discussed in Part IV, these cases are significant because they provide
authority for courts willing to recognize the vital role the-business owner can play
in deterring crime through crime prevention measures.6'
In Day, an intruder in an apartment complex hid in an apartment with a broken
lock and then assaulted a lessee. The fourth circuit held that the plaintiff had a
cause of action, reversing the summary judgment of the trial court. The court
explained that the Louisiana law of torts as stated in Civil Code article 2315 is very
broad. If the lessee could prove that the "lessor both facilitated the concealed
presence of violent intruders upon the premises and failed to warn the lessee that
such an intruder had previously assaulted a tenant," then the lessor was at fault
under Louisiana law.62
In its determination of the landlord's duty, the court considered these factors:
the lessor knew of the unreliability of the gate lock; the lessor kept the vacant
apartment unlocked; the lessor had been told by a former tenant that she had been
assaulted in the same apartment building as the plaintiff. The court stated that the
lessor had the duty to inform the lessee of the prior incident and to keep the other
apartment secure against intruders. Had the lessor fulfilled his duty, the court
reasoned, he could have impeded the intruder's access to the vacant apartment and
would have made the lessee more cautious about leaving her apartment at night.63
Thus, the court required the business owner to be careful not to facilitate-i.e.,
invite---crime on his premises. The business owner, like the innkeeper, should take
reasonable precautions against criminals. In addition, the business owner should
warn others of prior criminal incidents on the premises in the hopes of making them
more cautious.
The fourth circuit again used a similar analysis in Phillips, which involved a
fatal shooting in the parking lot of a food store. The case also acknowledged a
higher duty for the business owner and considered several different factors to
determine duty. As outlined by the fourth circuit, the trial court instructed the jury
with the following: "An owner... of land owes... the duty of exercising ordinary
care to maintain the premises in a reasonably safe condition."' That responsibili-
58. 407 So. 2d 510 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1981).
59. 413 So. 2d 696 (La. App. 4th Cir.), writ denied, 420 So. 2d 164 (1982).
60. Id. at 697; Day, 407 So. 2d at 511.
61. See infra text accompanying notes 193-95.
62. Day, 407 So. 2d at 511 (emphasis added).
63. Id.
64. Phillips v. Equitable Life Assurance Co. of the United States, 413 So. 2d 696, 697 (La.
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ty includes the duty to protect patrons from criminal acts of third parties when those
acts are reasonably foreseeable under the circumstances prevailing.65
To determine whether the acts were reasonably foreseeable, the court looked
at such factors as security for the shopping center, prior crimes on the premises and
in the area, adequacy of the lighting, and whether there were any signs indicating
the parking lot was patrolled. By analyzing the duty in this way, the court imposed
a duty on the business owner to take precautionary measures against crime.
66
Day and Phillips thus offer a different approach to the business owner's duty.
The approach is similar to the one proposed in Part IV in that the court considered
the condition, location, and past experience of the business establishment.
However, the following leading cases reveal that this approach was, more than
anything, an exception to the prevailing narrow approach to the business owner's
duty.
C. The Leading Cases
1. Banks v. Hyatt Corporation
61
In Banks, an armed robber murdered Dr. Banks a few feet from the entrance
to the Hyatt Hotel and the Poydras Plaza Mall in New Orleans. His widow and
children brought an action for wrongful death against the hotel and mall operators.
They charged the defendants with failing to provide adequate security and failing
to warn the doctor of the danger of being assaulted. 68 Although Banks is a U.S.
Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals case, Louisiana courts have effectively placed it on
equal footing with Harris, a Louisiana Supreme Court case. 69
As described, the cases leading up to Banks held the innkeeper to a high duty
of care, which involved taking reasonable precautions against criminals. However,
the cases failed to provide any factors for an analysis of the innkeeper's duty.70
The cases involving the business owner extended his duty to protect patrons to
those criminal acts which were foreseeable. 7t Most courts equated foreseeability
to an impending assault while two others used several different factors to determine
App. 4th Cir.), writ denied, 420 So. 2d 164 (1982).
65. Id.
66. Id. at 697-700. By discussing factors such as prior crimes, lighting, and security, the court
particularized the business owner's duty to exercise reasonable care, thereby providing some
guidelines as to how the business owner can fulfill his duty.
67. 722 F.2d 214 (5th Cir. 1984).
68. Id. at 215-16.
69. Professor Maraist maintains that "Banks expresses the present state of the law" in Louisiana
regarding the rule that a business owner owes no duty to protect a patron until he knows or has
reason to know a criminal act is about to occur. Frank L. Maraist, Louisiana Torts Law: Cases and
Materials 519 (1991).
70. See supra text accompanying notes 55-57.
71. See supra text accompanying notes 47-54.
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foreseeability.7 2 Not surprisingly, the Fifth Circuit certified questions to the
Louisiana Supreme Court as to which standard to apply, but the supreme court
answered with a denial, thereby allowing the Fifth Circuit to choose which duties
and analyses to employ.73
In its discussion of the hotel's liability, the Fifth Circuit focused on the
language from Kraaz stating that an innkeeper has a duty to take reasonable precau-
tions against criminals and that a guest is entitled to a high degree of care and
protection.74 It then cited Florida law for the rule that an innkeeper "may be liable
if he fails to take reasonable precautions to deter the type of criminal activity
which resulted in a guest's injury. ' 5 It concluded that the hotel was potentially
liable not only for dangerous physical conditions, but also for foreseeable criminal
assaults by third persons.76 The court thus adopted a foreseeability standard for
its analysis of the innkeeper's duty.
The court determined foreseeability for the innkeeper by using a "prior crimes"
rule. It reviewed the "incident reports" and "security log" of the hotel, both of
which showed a high incidence of crime in the area. 77 According to the court, the
evidence showed that the hotel "clearly was aware of the risk of criminal assault
that its guests faced. 78 The hotel therefore had a duty to protect its patrons, and
the jury determined that the hotel had breached that duty by employing inadequate
security measures.79
In discussing the mall owner's (business owner's) duty, the court referred to
the "impending assault" language of the earlier Louisiana cases-that the business
owner's duty to protect his patrons from injury extends to the criminal acts of third
parties when the business owner knows or should know of a third person's conduct
72. See supra text accompanying notes 58-66.
73. Banks v. Hyatt Corp., 436 So. 2d 1171 (La. 1983) (denying certification). The questions
which the Fifth Circuit certified directly addressed the method of determining the business owner's
duty:
Is a [business owner] ... under a duty of care to protect its invitees ... by warning or
by taking alternative security measures, from assaults or injury by third persons when it
has knowledge or should have knowledge... that an injury or an assault might occur ....
How immediate or foreseeable must the threat of harm be in order for the duty of care
to come into existence?
Banks v. Hyatt Corp., 722 F.2d 214, 216 n.1 (5th Cir. 1984) (citing Banks v. Hyatt Corp., 708 F.2d
159, 162 (5th Cir. 1983)).
74. Id. at 220.
75. Id. at 220-21 (alteration in original) (citing Reichenbach v. Days Inn, Inc., 401 So. 2d 1366,
1367 (Fla. App. 1981), petition for review denied, 412 So. 2d 469 (1982)).
76. Id. at 226.
77. id. at 218-19. These reports showed that in the three-month period prior to Dr. Banks'
murder, which occurred on April 12, 1979, there were eleven armed robberieg and five simple
robberies within the immediate surroundings of the hotel. In addition, Banks was the second person
to be shot at that entrance since 1976, and the fifth armed robbery victim at that specific entrance.
78. Id. at 226.
79. Id.
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which is about to occur and that conduct is within his power to prevent. The court
held the mall owner not liable because there was no evidence that he knew or
should have known that Dr. Banks was about to be assaulted.80 Thus, the court
concluded that the business owner's duty of care does not include a duty to adopt
precautionary measures to reduce the general risk of criminal assault.
The Banks court applied two different duties for the innkeeper and the
business owner. It adopted the innkeeper's duty to take precautionary measures
from Kraaz and created an analysis for that duty based on a "prior crimes"
rule." The court chose the limited "impending assault" standard for the
business owner, thus requiring him only to react to a crime he knows or should
know is imminent.12 .
Part III criticizes the application of the "impending assault" doctrine in cases
such as Banks because, as in Banks, most crimes occur without any warning to
the business owner or patron. The "impending assault" standard' is not only
unrealistic, but it also creates little incentive for the business owner to take
precautionary measures against crime.' 3 Several months after Banks, the
Louisiana Supreme Court had the opportunity to clearly reject the "impending
assault" standard and to propose new standards for the lower courts to use in
determining the business owner's duty. As the following case illustrates, the
supreme court unfortunately chose not to take advantage of that opportunity.
2. Harris v. Pizza Hut
In Harris, the Louisiana Supreme Court found a Pizza Hut security guard
negligent in the performance of his duties when faced by two armed robbers.' 5
As a result of the confrontation, the robbers shot at the guard, not only injuring
him in the process, but also killing Ms. Harris and wounding one of her
children.
The supreme court's opinion is rather confusing because while it appears to
impose a higher duty on the business owner, the court emphatically denied it was
doing so. For instance, the court, citing "pertinent law" from other jurisdictions,
stated: "[A]ny business which invites the company of the public must take
'reasonably necessary acts to guard against the predictable risk of assaults.' A
business proprietor owes a duty to those entering its premises to provide a
80. Id. at 220. The Fifth Circuit used the "impending assault" language used in Davenport.
81. Id. The evidence which the court used to determine that Hyatt was clearly aware of the
risks of criminal assaults was comprised solely of previous criminal incidents. Id. at 218-19.
82. Id. at 220.
83. The "impending assault" doctrine calls the business owner to react to a specific crime which
is about to occur or that is in progress. Thus, the business owner has no legal obligation to adopt
preventive measures and therefore has little incentive to do so.
84. 455 So. 2d 1364 (La. 1984).
85. ld. at 1372.
86. Id. at 1367.
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reasonably safe place.""7 It would seem that under this standard the business
owner, like the innkeeper, must take precautionary measures to deter crime.
However, the court set down another principle as the main rule of the case: "A
duty of protection which has been voluntarily assumed must be performed with
due care."88 Since Pizza Hut assumed the duty to protect, it was potentially
liable for the negligence of the guard. The jury found the guard negligent in the
way he responded to the robber; therefore, Pizza Hut was liable. 9
The court used the "assumed duty" principle to sidestep the issue of what
factors a court should consider to establish the business owner's duty to
protect-in this case, specifically whether Pizza Hut had the duty to hire a
security guard in the first place. After reviewing prior criminal incidents and
stating that the Pizza Hut was located in a high crime area,90 the court stated
in dicta that it was "unnecessary to decide how many prior criminal acts create
a duty" to hire a guard because Pizza Hut had already acknowledged that the
"risk of crime ... was sufficiently foreseeable" to require a guard.91 Therefore,
the duty existed as a matter of law because Pizza Hut had assumed it.92
To make sure the lower courts understood the "assumed duty" principle,
Justice Dennis wrote a concurring opinion stressing that Harris was "an ordinary
negligence case." 93 However, this surely was not an ordinary negligence case,
and the court could not conceal that fact. The broad language it used regarding
the business owner's duty "to provide a reasonably safe place," and the fact that
it reviewed prior criminal acts to conclude that the risk was sufficiently
foreseeable, reveal that the court indeed may have been setting new and higher
standards in the determination of the business owner's duty." In effect, the
court required the business owner, as it did the innkeeper, to take precautionary
measures against crime.
87. Id. at 1369 (citations omitted).
88. Id. (citations omitted).
89. Id. at 1372.
90. Id. at 1366. Pizza Hut's own reports showed that it had been robbed or burglarized more
than twenty times. The New Orleans Police Department's reports indicated seven previous instances
of criminal activity at the restaurant from January 1976, to the date of the fatal shooting on March
17, 1979. Most of these incidents were armed robberies occurring between the hours of 9:00 and
10:00 P.M. Id. at 1368.
91. Id. at 1371 (emphasis added).
92. Id. at 1372.
93. Id. at 1373 (Dennis, J., concurring).
94. Professor Robertson maintains that the language in Harris might be read to suggest that a
business owner has the same duty to protect patrons as the innkeeper- therefore, he may have an
obligation to adopt security measures if the risk of crime is high enough. David W. Robertson.
Negligence Liability for Crimes and Intentional Torts Comminted by Others, 67 Tul. L. Rev. 135, 173
(1992) [hereinafter Robertson, Negligence).
The Louisiana Supreme Court has recently reiterated the principles of Harris while applying them
to the case of Mundy v. Department of Health & Human Resources, 620 So. 2d 811 (La. 1993). See
infra text accompanying notes 177-80.
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D. Confusion in the Law Today
Banks, Harris, and the cases leading up to them provide Louisiana courts with
several different standards for determining the business owner's duty. Banks held
that the business owner has a limited duty to react to an "impending assault" and
does not have to take precautionary measures even though prior crimes may have
occurred on the premises. 95 Harris held that once a duty is assumed, it exists as
a matter of law, and a breach of that duty is determined by the jury. However, in
its analysis the Harris court implied through a "prior crimes" approach that the
business owner had a duty to take precautions against sufficiently foreseeable risks
of crime.96 Day and Phillips determined the duty of the business owner by
focusing on a variety of factors which would invite criminal attacks on the
premises. These two cases imposed on the business owner a duty to take
precautionary measures not only after a high number of prior crimes occurred, but
also if the location and condition of the premises called for such measures. 9'
Recent cases illustrate that courts continue to grapple with these three different
degrees of duty. Some courts strictly adhere to the "impending assault" standard,
others use a combination of the "impending assault" and "prior crimes" standards,
and one other, as discussed in Part IV, uses a more demanding approach. There is
added confusion in the courts' analyses resulting from the application of the
assumed duty principle; The inconsistency in the law undoubtedly leaves the
business owner uncertain of his legal obligations.
1. Strict Adherence to the Impending Assault Doctrine
Potter v. First Savings and Loan Association of Scotlandville9" involved a
lessee of an apartment who was raped and robbed in the parking lot of the complex.
Although the first circuit court of appeal found the lessor not liable based on
Louisiana Civil Code article 270399 which pertains to lease (and thereby affirmed
the trial court's summary judgment),' °° the court.also expressed its opinion as to
whether the plaintiff would prevail in tort. In a rather lengthy footnote, the court
quoted language from a previous case outlining the "impending assault" doctrine.
The court stated that the facts were insufficient to show that the defendant knew or
should have known of the rapist's intended conduct.'
°
95. See supra text accompanying notes 80-82.
96. See supra text accompanying notes 87-94.
97. See supra text accompanying notes 58-66.
98. 602 So. 2d 1070 (La. App. Ist Cir. 1992). vacated, 615 So. 2d 318 (1993).
99. Louisiana Civil Code article 2703 provides:
The lessor is not bound to guarantee the lessee against disturbances caused by persons
not claiming any right to the premises; but in that case the lessee has a right of action for
damages sustained against the person occasioning such disturbance.
100. Potter, 602 So. 2d at 1072-73.
101. Id. at 1073 n.3.
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Thus, according to the court's reasoning, the business owner in this case would
only have a duty to protect if she knew or should have known the rapist was about
to attack the lessee. Even though there was overwhelming evidence of the dangers
in and around the apartment complex,'0 2 the court chose to follow the strict
"impending assault" cases. As will be shown in Part II1, the impending assault
analysis is inappropriate in such a case and the standard should be abandoned for
one which is sensitive to the factors which facilitate crime.'0 3
The Louisiana Supreme Court recently vacated the summary judgment in
Potter and remanded the case for further proceedings.' 4 The court held that
Article 2703 does not immunize the lessor from the lessee's claims of breaches of
"contractual and/or tort duties to maintain adequate exterior lighting, to keep the
complex in a reasonably safe condition and/or to provide her a reasonably safe
place. '"'0 5 Although the supreme court referred to the footnote in the first
circuit's opinion,'0 it did not address whether the "impending assault" standard was
the proper standard to apply.
However, the court found relevant to the issue of foreseeability of the criminal
attack that another tenant had noticed an unknown male lurking in the parking lot
on an earlier occasion. In addition, the court found that "[g]enuine issues ... exist
as to ... whether the inadequate lighting encouraged criminal attacks and/or
enhanced their foreseeability . 1...'"07 This language seems to suggest that courts
should apply a broader standard than the "impending assault" in cases such as
Potter and consider such factors as prior incidents and inadequate lighting. Again,
however, the court did not directly reject the "impending assault" doctrine and thus
courts conceivably may still apply it to cases in which there is no warning of an
impending criminal attack.
2. Combination of Impending Assault and Prior Crimes
Some courts choose not to adhere strictly to the "impending assault" standard
and have moved towards imposing a higher duty on the business owner by
employing a combination of the "impending assault" and "prior crimes" stan-
dards.'0 8 In Foster v. Colonel Sanders Kentucky Fried Chicken, Inc.,' °9 the trial
102. Prior to the rape, the apartment complex had experienced several instances of burglary and
vandalism. The rear two units had been badly vandalized and the apartment manager was fully aware
of the criminal activity that was taking place. In addition, the lighting around the complex was so
inadequate that the tenants iled several complaints with the manager. Moreover, the complex was
located in a high crime area of Baton Rouge. Id. at 1071-72.
103. See infra text accompanying notes 149-55.
104. Potter v. First Federal Sav. and Loan Ass'n of Scotlandville, 615 So. 2d 318 (La. 1993).
105. Id. at 325-26.
106. Id. at 322.
107. Id. at 326 (emphasis added).
108. See Mundy v. Department of Health and Human Resources, 609 So. 2d 909 (La. App. 4th
Cir. 1992), aff'd, 620 So. 2d 811 (1993); Russell v. McDonald's Corp., 576 So. 2d 1213 (La. App.
5th Cir. 1991); Smith v. Walgreens Louisiana Co., 542 So. 2d 766 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1989); Ballew
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judge dismissed the claims of a customer who was shot in an attempted robbery.
The plaintiff argued that the employees had a duty to react to the impending assault
and that the store should have adopted more adequate safety measures."°
The second circuit court of appeal found that the employees could not have
known of the impending specific robbery. The court then turned to the dicta in
Harris regarding the business owner's duty to take preventive measures after a high
number of prior crimes had occurred on the premises. The court determined that
the one prior robbery which had occurred at the restaurant was not enough to
activate the duty of taking precautionary measures against crime."'
The Foster court thus analyzed the business owner's duty using a two-step
process. It first determined whether the case involved an impending assault and
then inquired into the risk of crime at the store employing a prior crimes approach.
This case is significant in that it recognized the business owner should not only
react to a specific impending assault, but also should adopt precautionary measures
if there is a history of criminal incidents at the business establishment. By using
a combination of the "impending assault" and "prior crimes" standards, the court
demonstrated that these two standards are not mutually exclusive. In other words,
it is possible for courts to impose both a duty to react and a duty to take precaution-
ary measures on the business owner." 2 Thus, through its use of a combination
of the "impending assault" and "prior crimes" standards, Foster added yet another
aspect to the business owner's duty."
3
3. The "Assumed Duly" Principle
The "assumed duty" principle of Harris"4 added confusion rather than
guidance to the lower courts' analyses of the business owner's duty. Two recent
cases dealt with business owners who had security measures in place. Under
Harris, the duty to protect was assumed and therefore existed as a matter of law,
allowing the jury to determine breach."' However, in Sutter v. Audubon Park
v. Southland Corp.. 482 So. 2d 890 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1986): Miles v. Flor-Line Assocs.. 442 So. 2d
584 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1983); Pennington v. Church's Fried Chicken, Inc., 393 So. 2d 360 (La. App.
1st Cir. 1980).
109. 526 So. 2d 252 (La. App. 2d Cir.), writ denied, 531 So. 2d 483 (1988).
110. Id. at 253-54.
111. Id. at 256-58. However, the court stated, "This is not to say the evidence of this shooting,
together with two subsequent crimes admitted into evidence, might not on some future occasion be
construed as grounds of knowledge that the store is in an area prone to crime and that deterrent
measures should have been taken." Id. at 258 n.2.
112. See infra text accompanying notes 149-165.
113. What is meant by "another aspect" is that the analysis for the business owner should not
be based on only one standard of foreseeability. The courts should first determine if the case
involves an "impending assault" and then move on to other relevant factors making a crime more
likely, such as prior crimes, high crime area, lighting, and design. See infra Part IV.
114. See supra text accompanying notes 88-92.
115. Harris v. Pizza Hut, 455 So. 2d 1364, 1372 (La. 1984).
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Commission,1 6 the fourth circuit held that, as a matter of law, the park had no
duty to protect one specific shelter, even though security measures existed to cover
the whole park." 7 Similarly, in Mundy v. Department of Health and Human
Resources,"8 the fourth circuit again held that, as a matter of law, the hospital
had no legal duty to employ guards at a specific elevator of the hospital, even
though security measures were in place throughout the hospital in general.' 9
These decisions reveal that the courts have turned the assumed duty principle
into a malleable concept. Instead of allowing juries to determine breach in such
cases,1 20 the courts have reserved the power to decide them at the duty level by
breaking down the assumed security measures into specific duties to guard specific
places on the premises. As a result, the assumed duty principle seems to have lost
its original meaning as outlined in Harris.'
2 1
E. Summary of the Jurisprudence
The jurisprudence involving the business owner's duty to protect patrons from
the criminal acts of third parties provides the courts with a variety of choices in
determining duty. The courts may impose a limited duty to react, a higher duty to
take precautionary measures after a high number of prior crimes have occurred, or
an even higher duty to take such measures according to the location, condition, and
past experience of the business establishment. As the following analysis explains,
these approaches are deficient in that they fail to consider all the relevant factors
specific to criminal acts cases as well as the factors comprising the duty/risk
analysis.
III. ANALYSIS
The jtdrisprudence reveals that in the overwhelming majority of cases, the
Louisiana courts have relied on foreseeability, whether defined in terms of
"impending assault" or "prior crimes," as the all-important factor in determining
the business owner's duty to protect patrons from the criminal acts of third parties.
In doing so, the courts have neglected the significant socio-economic factors
116. 533 So. 2d 1226 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1988), writ denied, 538 So. 2d 597 (1989).
117. Id. at 1234. The plaintiff was confronted by an unknown gunman and shot in the chest
while using the restroom facilities in Shelter No. 12 of the park. Shelters are small buildings which
contain the park's restroom facilities. Id. at 1228.
118. 609 So. 2d 909 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1992), aff'd, 620 So. 2d 811 (1993).
119. Id. at 915.
120. Although Sutter and Mundy were both judge trials (the city and state were both defendants
in these cases), the fact that the court stated it was deciding the cases at the duty level is significant.
Courts can use these cases as authority to keep juries from determining "assumed duty" cases at the
breach level.
121. However, an example of a correct application of the Harris principles is the fifth circuit's
decision in Hanewinckel v. St. Paul's Property & Liability Ins. Co., 611 So. 2d 174 (La. App. 5th
Cir. 1992), writ denied, 614 So. 2d 65 (1993).
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inherent in the duty/risk approach.' The effect of not reviewing the duty/risk
factors is that the courts fail to impose a more demanding duty on the business
owner to take a variety of precautionary measures against criminals according to
the circumstances.
2 3
Moreover, the courts have failed to recognize that the "impending assault" and
"prior crimes" approaches are two different standards for two different factual
situations.'24 The courts should employ the "impending assault" approach only
in those situations in which the business owner has actual knowledge that a crime
is about to occur. The approach is inappropriate when applied in the more usual
occurrence of the "spontaneous" crime in which the patron falls victim to a surprise
attack.25
Courts should apply the "prior crimes" approach in that case because although
there are no warning signs of the impending attack, prior incidents are a good
indication that a crime is likely to occur in the future. 126 The proper analysis to
follow in third party criminal acts cases is the one used by the second circuit in
Foster-a two-step process. They should first see if the incident was an impending
assault and then consider factors which facilitated criminal activity on the premises.
The Louisiana Supreme Court has compounded these deficiencies in the
courts' analyses by providing little guidance, even though it has had several
opportunities to institute some standards in this area of tort law. The court has
shown a general reluctance to discuss the policies behind establishing a business
owner's duty to take precautionary measures against crime. As a result, it too has
used foreseeability as the all important factor in determining duty.
127
A. The Role of Foreseeability in the Duty/Risk Analysis as Applied to Business
Owners
When the Louisiana Supreme Court expressly adopted the duty/risk approach
in Hill v. Lundin, ' 28 it intended to make foreseeability just one factor in the
determination of a duty: "Foreseeability is not always a reliable guide, and
certainly it is not the only criterion for determining whether there is a duty/risk
relationship."'' 2  Professor Robertson maintains that in Hill, the supreme court
122. For descriptions of the duty/risk approach, see Robertson. supra note 18, and Crowe, supra
note 19. For a modem analysis of the approach, see Thomas C. Galligan, Jr., Hill v. Lundin and
Associates Revisited: Duty Risked to Death?, LSU Publications (forthcoming 1993).
123. See infra text accompanying notes 138-148.
124. Professor Robertson maintains a similar view: "A number of post-Harris decisions discuss
both views on the extent of an ordinary business' duty to take anti-crime precautions and apply [the
"prior crimes" rule] without explicit acknowledgement that the two views are inconsistent."
Robertson, Negligence, supra note 94, at 174 (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted).
125. See Yelnosky. supra note 5, at 904.
126. See Kaufman, supra note 25, at 113-14.
127. See infra text accompanying notes 166-176.
128. 260 La. 542, 256 So. 2d 620 (La. 1972).
129. Id. at 549, 256 So. 2d at 622.
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meant to admonish the lower courts against the notion that foreseeability is
magic. 10 Courts should instead discuss a variety of socio-economic factors
shaping their decisions to impose a duty in a case. In other words, the courts should
be asking: Will the courts be able to manage the litigation resulting from the
imposition of a duty in a given situation? Is the plaintiff's harm easily associated
with the defendant's conduct? What are the economic impacts on the plaintiff and
defendant and those similarly situated from the imposition of a duty? Does it seem
right to impose a duty in this case? Does society call the courts to impose a duty
in this situation? Professor Crowe (drawing from the works of Malone and
McDonald) has labeled these questions as the administrative, ease of association,
economic, moral, and historical or precedent factors.'31
This section will apply the duty/risk analysis to the business owner's duty to
protect patrons from the criminal acts of third parties. First, however, the courts'
continuing struggle with the role of foreseeability in the determination of duty will
be explored.
1. Struggling With the Foreseeability Factor
Even though the supreme court adopted the duty/risk approach over twenty
years ago, Louisiana courts still grapple with the notion of foreseeability and who
decides it at what stage in a negligence case. The fourth circuit's opinion in Smith
v. Walgreens Louisiana Co. 32 illustrates the conflict among the court in using
foreseeability to determine the business owner's duty to protect patrons from the
criminal acts of third parties. In Smith, a woman was raped and robbed after being
abducted from a Walgreens parking lot. The trial judge entered summary judgment
in favor of Walgreens, which the fourth circuit reversed an'd remanded for trial on
the merits. The fourth circuit explained that the duty to protect arises when the
crime is sufficiently foreseeable. It concluded that the jurisprudence indicated that
"a high number of such incidents is necessary to establish foreseeability."'3
The court then maintained that since it was unable to say that the incident was
foreseeable from the evidence presented in the record, the issue of foreseeability
should be referred to the trial on the merits.'3 4 However, if foreseeability
produces the duty to protect, and duty is a question of law, then would not sending
the issue of foreseeability to the jury in effect mean that the jury would be deciding
duty?
The dissent maintained that Walgreens owed no duty as a matter of law. It
reasoned that by sending the case to trial, the majority had assumed Walgreens had
a duty because the jury was not supposed to have a role in the duty inquiry.' 35
130. See Robertson, supra note 18, at 25.
131. Crowe, supra note 19, at 906.
132. 542 So. 2d 766 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1989).
133. Id. at 768.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 769 (Ward, J., dissenting) ("Whether a duty exists is a question of law, to be decided
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The dissent also maintained that foreseeability of the criminal attack should not
be relevant to a duty inquiry. It referred to the socio-economic factQrs outlined by
Professor Crowe and noted that the foreseeability which played a role in the duty
inquiry was actually the ease of association factor. 3 6 In applying the duty/risk
approach, the dissent determined that Walgreens owed no duty to the plaintiff. It
found that a rape was not easily associated with the conduct of permitting invitees
to park in a parking lot adjacent to a retail establishment; that the imposition of a
duty would be too great of an economic burden because Walgreens and other retail
establishments similarly situated would have to hire security guards; and that
establishing a duty in this case would undermine the jurisprudence of Banks and
Harris which expressly limited the business owner's duty to protect patrons against
the criminal acts of third parties.'
2. Duty/Risk as Applied to Business Owners
The dissenters in Smith should be praised for discussing the policy factors
which a court should consider in determining duty; however, their analysis of those
factors fails to account for a changing society. For instance, the rape could be
easily associated with Walgreens' conduct of permitting invitees to park in the lot.
Retail establishments and parking structures head the list of targets for criminal
activity.'38 Parking lots themselves present an "especial temptation and
opportunity for criminal misconduct."' 39 In addition, Walgreens was located in
a high crime area and had encountered prior criminal incidents.'4 Thus, in
actuality, the rape was easily associated with permitting invitees to park on the lot
if the dissenters were to consider the nature, condition, location, and past
experience of the premises. Such factors are specifically relevant in criminal acts
cases.1
41
In deciding that the duty would be too much of an economic burden, the
dissent failed to recognize the business owner's ability to spread the costs of
providing protection among its patrons. 42 Moreover, measures such as proper
lighting in parking areas "are easily definable and relatively inexpensive to
maintain."
' 1
Although the dissenters were correct in finding that the jurisprudence created
a limited duty for the business owner, they did not consider the other significant
in the first instance by the Trial Court.") (citations omitted).
136. Id. at 770.
137. Id. at 769-70.
138. See supra note 24.
139. Isaacs v. Huntington Memorial Hosp., 695 P.2d 653, 660 (Cal. 1985).
140. Smith v. Walgreens Louisiana Co., 542 So. 2d 766, 768 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1989).
141. See infra text accompanying notes 182-187.
142. See supra text accompanying notes 33-35.
143. Kaufman, supra note 25, at 114 (footnote omitted).
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component of the precedent factor. As Professor Crowe writes, this factor involves
not only looking back but also looking forward.'"
Precedent is important but one can never rely upon it completely and
securely. If a rule were established as a precedent over a century ago, and
if many exceptions have eroded the rule to an empty and meaningless
proposition, one does not have to be a seer to understand that the last
vestiges of the rule are subject to momentary collapse. This type of
viewing the past with an eye to the future is much in accord with the
civilian concept of jurisprudence constante .... "'
The commentators have noted that in common law there was traditionally a no-
duty-to-act rule. 46 Louisiana courts followed that rule but have been slow to
recognize its erosion. The "impending assault" doctrine, the "prior crimes" rule,
and cases such as Day and Phillips illustrate the withering away of the no-duty-to-
act rule. If Louisiana courts were to look at these exceptions with an eye toward
the future, they would appreciate the vital role the business owner could play in
deterring crime and realize the great need to impose a more demanding duty on the
business owner.
If the dissent had discussed the administrative factor, it would have discovered
that the courts can manage the litigation that would result from imposing a higher
duty on the business owner by carefully articulating the factors important in
deciding criminal acts cases.' 4' The factors proposed in Part IV should help
convey to crime victims that business owners do not owe them an unqualified duty
of protection, but the circumstances determine the business owner's duty to adopt
preventive measures. For example, the moral factor in criminal acts cases would
be shaped by how much the business owner is to blame for creating an environment
which facilitated criminal activity. 48
Thus, if the courts were to examine the duty/risk factors, they would
understand the need to impose a higher duty on the business owner to take
precautionary measures against crime. Unfortunately, the overwhelming majority
of Louisiana cases neglect the duty/risk factors and continue to use a narrow
definition of foreseeability as the key factor in determining the business owner's
duty.. The following section describes the negative effects of the courts' undue
reliance on foreseeability in analyzing the business owner's duty.
144. Crowe, supra note 19, at 908.
145. Id. at 908-09.
146. See generally Fowler V. Harper and Posey M. Kime, The Duty to Control the Conduct of
Another, 43 Yale L.J. 886 (1934); Leonard, supra note 36, at 830-34; Yelnosky, supra note 5, at 888-
89.
147. Courts can manage the litigation in the same way that they can prevent the business owner
from becoming subject to unlimited liability, i.e.. through the duty decisionmaking process. See
supra note 36 and accompanying text.
148. "The moral factor is essentially a visceral reaction to what seems right or wrong." Crowe,
supra note 19, at 908.
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B. Reaction v. Precaution
The "impending assault" doctrine articulated in such cases as Rodriguez,
Davenport, and Banks focuses on the business owner's reaction to a crime
occurring on the premises. 4 9 All of the courts have recognized that business
owners at least have a duty to react under that circumstance to protect their
patrons. 50 Imposing this duty to react is proper if the situation calls for it, such
as in Davenport when the motel operator was informed of the danger facing a
guest. '5 However, in most cases this standard is inappropriate as most criminal
acts occur without actual warning.' The "impending assault" doctrine is thus
a harsh standard as it serves as a bar to recovery for most victims of spontaneous
criminal acts.' The standard does not take into account prior criminal acts, but
"deals with each incident in isolation, as if it were the first of its kind."' 5 4 More
importantly, it discourages business owners from investigating crime in the area or
taking safety measures because under this standard they are not required to do
so.
155
An approach using prior criminal acts to determine duty at least recognizes that
a business owner may have a duty to take precautionary measures to deter
crime.'56 Some courts have employed this approach, as in Foster, Day, Phillips,
Smith, and arguably Harris. However, an approach based solely on prior criminal
acts also has its faults. For instance, the business owner is not quite sure of when
149. See supra text accompanying notes 47-54 and 67-83.
150. The "impending assault" and "prior crimes" cases comprise the majority of the
jurisprudence involving the business owner's duty to protect patrons from the criminal acts of third
parties in Louisiana. These cases employ the language that business owners have a duty to protect
patrons only from those crimes which are foreseeable. The most conservative view of foreseeability
is that the business owner must know that a specific crime is about to occur. No court seems to
dispute that that situation fits under the category of foreseeable.
151. Davenport v. Nixon, 434 So. 2d 1203, 1205-06 (La. App. Ist Cir. 1983).
152. Yelnosky, supra note 5, at 904-05.
153. See Banks v. Hyatt Corp., 722 F.2d 214 (5th Cir. 1984); Rodriguez v. NOPSI, 400 So. 2d
884 (La. 1981); Potter v. First Federal Say. and Loan Ass'n, 602 So. 2d 1070 (La. App. Ist Cir.
1992), vacated, 615 So. 2d 318 (1993); Owens v. Regional Transit Auth., 559 So. 2d 870 (La. App.
4th Cir. 1990); Brent v. Williams, 524 So. 2d 158 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1988); Coblentz v. North Peters
Parking Inc., 533 So. 2d 98 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1988); Pinkney v. Miller, 439 So. 2d 1113 (La. App.
4th Cir. 1983), writ denied, 444 So. 2d 117, reconsideration denied, 445 So. 2d 443 (1984).
154. - Yelnosky, supra note 5, at 905.
155. Id. at 904. Yelnosky notes that under the "impending assault" standard, "[i]gnorance can
be bliss." That is, as long as the business owner does not know about the dangers facing his patrons,
he is not obligated to act on their behalf. Thus, the standard does nothing to encourage the business
owner to keep informed about dangerous situations which might occur on his premises. Id.
Although, as the market theorists argue, adopting precautionary measures would be in the business
owner's economic interest, common experience demonstrates that generalized economic incentives
have not been enough to encourage efficient crime prevention. See supra text accompanying notes
26-29.
156. See supra text accompanying notes 74-79.
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his duty to take precautionary measures arises."7 In Smith, the court required the
past incidents to be at or near the time the crime at issue occurred.158 In Foster,
the court stated in a footnote that four crimes may be enough. 159 In addition, the
standard is very harsh for the first, second, or maybe third crime victim as they will
go uncompensated.' 60 The standard also does not provide incentives for the
business owners to design their property with an eye on crime prevention or to
investigate crime in the area.' 6' Only after a high number of crimes has occurred
on the premises does the business owner's duty to take preventive measures arise.
Some courts mix the "impending assault" and "prior crimes" standards without
even acknowledging that these approaches involve two different situations.'62
Professor Robertson argues that an explanation of the confusion lies in the
comment to Section 344 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts which outlines the
business owner's duty. 63 The comment lists both standards and provides a subtle
distinction between the two according to the facts of the case. 64 Many courts
have failed to recognize that distinction and incorrectly apply the "impending
assault" doctrine in cases where there was no actual warning of the crime.
65
The "impending assault" doctrine and "prior crimes" rule should be applied
only as factors in the determination of the business owner's duty. That is, they
should be applied when the facts call for them, but they should never be the only
factors a court uses to determine the business owner's duty as they do little to
encourage him to take preventive measures to deter crime. Courts should employ
the duty/risk approach along with a variety of relevant factors as outlined in Part
IV.
C. The Louisiana Supreme Court Avoids an Important Issue
The confusion in the courts of appeal may be a result of the supreme court's
lack of guidance and its conflicting messages in this area of tort law. For instance,
in Banks, the U.S. Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals certified several questions to the
Louisiana Supreme Court concerning the duties of the innkeeper and business
owner to protect their patrons from the criminal acts of third parties.' 66 The Fifth
Circuit specifically asked how foreseeable the threat of harm must be in order for
the duty to arise for the innkeeper and business owner, and what sorts of security
157. Yelnosky, supra note 5, at 905-06.
158. Smith v. Walgreens Louisiana Co., 542 So. 2d 766, 768 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1989).
159. Foster v. Colonel Sanders Kentucky Fried Chicken, Inc., 526 So. 2d 252, 258 n.2 (La. App.
2d Cir.), writ denied, 531 So. 2d 483 (1988).
160. Yelnosky, supra note 5, at 905.
161. Id.
162. See supra note 98 and cases cited therein.
163. Robertson, Negligence, supra note 94, at 174.
164. Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 344, comment f (1965).
165. See supra note 153 and cases cited therein.
166. See supra note 73 and accompanying text.
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measures must they take. 167 It apparently could not find any controlling law in
Louisiana, but the supreme court denied certification because it believed there were
existing principles of law applicable to the case. 168 However, the Fifth Circuit
resorted to Florida law for the innkeeper's duty and adopted the "impending
assault" language from Davenport for the business owner's duty. 169 There were
other Louisiana cases the court could have easily applied that uphold a higher duty
for the business owner, such as Day and Phillips. Unfortunately, in denying
certification, the Louisiana Supreme Court permitted the Fifth Circuit to adopt the
"impending assault" standard for business owners. The courts of appeal would use
Banks in later cases as authority for a narrow duty for business owners.
70
In Harris, the Louisiana Supreme Court had an opportunity to either adopt
Banks or set standards of its own.'' The court seemed to set a higher standard
for business owners than the one stated in Banks. At the same time, the court
denied it was doing So. 172 In fact, the court in responding to the amicus briefs of
the Louisiana Restaurant Association stated that that issue "is left for decision at
another time."' 73 Although the court enunciated the "assumed duty" principle,
the courts have applied it in such a way that the concept seems to have lost its
intended meaning.7 In addition, the principle may actually prevent the business
owner from taking such steps as hiring a security guard to protect patrons because
it provides that those cases go immediately to the jury. Therefore, the business
owner may want to avoid the risk of being liable for the negligence of a guard,
which was the result in Harris, by not hiring a guard to protect patrons.
In Dye v. Schwegmann Giant Super Markets, Inc., 75 the supreme court
vacated and remanded the case back to the fourth circuit, stating that the jury
instructions were erroneous under Harris.176 Arguably, the supreme court meant
that the assumed duty principle should have comprised thejury instructions;
however, its reasoning was not clear. On the other hand, the court could have
meant that the jury should be guided by a "prior crimes" approach in their
determination of breach. Again the court failed to take advantage of the opportuni-
ty to set down standards for determining the duty of the business owner.
167. Id.
168. Banks v. Hyatt Corp., 722 F.2d 214, 216 (5th Cir. 1984) (citing Banks v. Hyatt Corp., 436
So. 2d 1171 (La. 1983)).
169. Id. at 220.
170. See Potter v. First Federal Say. and Loan Ass'n of Scotlandville, 602 So. 2d 1070, 1073
n.3 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1992), vacated, 615 So. 2d 318 (1993).
171. "Harris ... was considered by some as a vehicle for re-examination of the rule that a
storekeeper owes no duty to protect a patron until he knows that a criminal act is about to occur."
Maraist, supra note 69, at 519.
172. See supra text accompanying notes 84-94.
173. Harris v. Pizza Hut of Louisiana, Inc., 455 So. 2d 1364, 1372 n.16 (La. 1984).
174. See supra text accompanying notes 114-120.
175. 607 So. 2d 564 (La.), reh'g denied, 609 So. 2d 248 (1992).
176. Id. at 565.
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Finally, in the recent case of Mundy v. Department of Health and Human
Resources, the supreme court, in affirming the fourth circuit's decision, clearly
stated the "assumed duty" principle of Harris, but at the same time included rather
confusing dicta in its opinion.' The court stated that because the Department
had assumed a duty to protect, the only question was whether the Department
breached that duty, that is, "whether the security measures or procedures
undertaken by the Department were reasonable."'78 The court then surprisingly
quoted from the Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 344 comment (f) (1965):
If the place or character of his business, or his past experience, is such that
he [the proprietor] should reasonably anticipate careless or criminal
conduct on the part of third persons, either generally or at some particular
time, he may be under a duty to take precautions against it, and to provide
a reasonably sufficient number of servants to afford a reasonable
protection.'79
As can be seen, this comment focuses primarily on the factors which should
be considered when determining whether a duty to protect exists; however, the
court cited the comment in its discussion of breach. The court's citing of the
comment at that point in its opinion may be an indication that the court is willing
to consider the place, character, and past experience of the business when
determining breach (and perhaps eOen when determining duty). However, the
court's analysis reveals instead that the overriding factor used to determine breach
was that there were no prior indidents in and around the elevator in which the crime
occurred.' S Judging from the court's analysis, Mundy is simply Harris revisited
with some confusing dicta. Again the supreme court failed to seize this opportunity
to announce clear or new standards for determining the business owner's duty to
protect patrons and/or breach of that duty.
IV. RECOMMENDATIONS
As illustrated in Part II, the overwhelming majority of Louisiana courts
presently consider a narrow set of factors in determining the business owner's duty
to protect patrons from the criminal acts of third parties. The courts focus on
foreseeability of the criminal act by either applying the "impending assault" or
"prior crimes" standards. Part III criticized both approaches because they do little
to encourage the business owner to take precautionary measures against crime nor
do they increase the victim's chances of compensation. Louisiana courts should
adopt an approach that allows them to articulate and consider a number of factors
in determining the business owner's duty. By articulating these factors, the courts
can particularize the general reasonable care standard so that the business owner
177. 620 So. 2d 811 (La. 1993).
178. Id. at 813-14.
179. Id. at 814.
180. Id. at 814-15.
1872 [Vol. 53
COMMENTS
will know that he has a duty to adopt precautionary measures and what that duty
entails. This section discusses the factors comprising this approach to the business
owner's duty and demonstrates how Louisiana courts can employ this approach
within the framework of Louisiana law.
A. Proposed Approach to the Business Owner's Duty
In determining the duty of the business owner in third party criminal acts cases,
the courts should employ the duty/risk approach, first considering if the case
involved an "impending assault" in which there were actual warnings that the
criminal attack was imminent,' 8 ' and second focusing on the nature, condition,
location, and past experience of the business establishment., 2
1. Nature
When considering the nature of the business establishment, the courts should
focus on the type or character of the business establishment and whether it is one
which by its nature attracts crime. For instance, the parking lots of retail
establishments present the criminal with an opportunity to rob. 83 Patrons usually
arrive at stores carrying money ready to purchase items, and leave carrying bags of
those items.
Business owners should be sensitive to the nature of parking lots and adopt
surveillance measures such as video cameras and roving patrols to deter criminal
activity on the premises. Courts can provide incentives for business owners to take
such measures by considering the nature of the business establishment in
determining the business owner's duty.
2. Condition
When considering the condition of a business establishment, a court should
look at the characteristics of the property itself and whether those characteristics
181. Examples of cases in which there were actual warning signs that a criminal attack was
imminent include: Johnston v. Fontana, 610 So. 2d 1119 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1992); Ballew v.
Southland Corp., 482 So. 2d 890 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1986); Davenport v. Nixon, 434 So. 2d 1203 (La.
App. 1st Cir. 1983).
182. For a similar approach, see Isaacs v. Huntington Memorial Hosp., 695 P.2d 652 (Cal.
1985). The Isaacs approach has been adopted in Alabama and Florida. See Brock v. Watts Realty
Company, Inc., 582 So. 2d 438 (Ala. 1991); and Paterson v. Deeb, 472 So. 2d 1210 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
1985), review denied, 484 So. 2d 8 (1986). Comment f to Section 344 of Restatement (Second) of
Torts also seems to advocate such an approach: "If the place or character of his business, or his past
experience, is such that he should reasonably anticipate ... criminal conduct on the part of third
persons, either generally or at some particular time, he may be under a duty to take precautions
against it .... (emphasis added). This section will define the factors identified by both Isaacs and
the Restatement.
183. See supra text accompanying note 24.
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invite crime on the premises. For instance, under this category courts should focus
on the design of the building. Are there any exits or entrances which bring patrons
into isolated areas where they could be in danger? Are there unlocked rooms in the
building into which intruders could force patrons and assault them? Were the
premises fenced off so as to keep intruders from coming onto the premises and/or
making an escape difficult?
In addition to design, the courts should consider whether there is inadequate
lighting for the business' nighttime operation and whether there are any obstruc-
tions, such as bushes, which could conceal criminals for surprise attacks. In Potter,
for example, the first circuit should have considered the role that the inadequate
lighting in the apartment complex parking lot played in facilitating the assault
which occurred. As noted, the supreme court's opinion recognized the importance
of this factor. 4 Courts also should consider the effectiveness of security locks
on doors and windows, and the adequacy of surveillance measures such as patrols
and video cameras.
3. Location
The most important consideration under the location category is whether the
business is located in a high crime area. Courts should consider the severity of the
crime problem around business establishments and encourage business owners to
keep informed about these incidents and take measures to prevent their prolifera-
tion.'
4. Past Experience
This category is the prior crimes rule that some courts have applied in past
cases."8 6 Courts should consider the history of crime for a particular business and
encourage the owner to discover criminal activity occurring on his premises.
Although some courts stress the differences between personal crimes (assaults) and
property crimes (car thefts), 7 courts should recognize that property crimes can
always escalate into personal crimes. The business owner should keep apprised of
all criminal activities occurring on his premises and adopt precautionary measures
accordingly.
Thus, the main categories which courts should consider in determining the
business owner's duty are the nature, condition, location, and past experience of the
business establishment. Under each of these categories, the courts should articulate
the various factors outlined above so as to create incentives for the business owner
184. Potter v. First Federal Say. and Loan Ass'n of Scotlandville, 615 So. 2d 318, 326 (La.
1993).
185. But see supra note 34 and accompanying text.
186. See supra text accompanying notes 74-81.
187. Willie v. American Casualty Co., 547 So. 2d 1075, 1085 (La. App. Ist Cir. 1989), writ
denied, 584 So. 2d 678 (1991).
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to take crime prevention measures. This list is not exclusive and the courts should
always be open to considering any new factors which may be relevant in a
particular case.
It should also be noted that courts should use the proposed approach in
conjunction with the duty/risk approach. In Part III the duty/risk approach was
applied to the business owner case of Smith. By considering the administrative,
economic, ease of association, moral, and historical or precedent factors, it was
determined that the courts should impose a more demanding duty on the business
owner to take precautionary measures against crime. The proposed categories are
meant to be supplemental factors which specifically deal with criminal acts cases.
B. Model Cases
In Isaacs v. Huntington Memorial Hospital,'88 the California Supreme Court
used an approach similar to the one proposed in its determination of the business
owner's duty to protect patrons from the criminal acts of third parties. In Isaacs,
a doctor sued a hospital for injuries he sustained when he was shot in the hospital
parking lot. The issue to be decided by the supreme court was whether the plaintiff
could establish foreseeability other than by evidence of prior similar incidents. The
California courts of appeal had apparently formed a rule that foreseeability in third
party criminal acts cases could only be proven by prior similar incidents.' 89
The supreme court held that foreseeability is "but one factor in determining
whether a landowner owes a duty in a particular case," and that "foreseeability is
an elastic factor."' 9 The other factors which the California Supreme Court used
to determine the hospital's duty reflect the court's modern analysis. For instance,
the court considered the location of the hospital and found it was located in a high
crime area and that there had been thefts and assaults in nearby areas around the
hospital. It examined the condition of the hospital premises and discovered that the
lighting was inadequate in the parking lot on the evening of the shooting and there
was no security. The court also discussed the nature of the premises and found that
parking areas create an "especial temptation and opportunity for crime," and that
"emergency room facilities and surrounding areas are inherently dangerous."''
In Louisiana, there are three cases in which the courts employed a similar
approach: Day, Phillips, and Willie v. American Casualty, Co. 192 The Day court
focused on the way the landlord had facilitated the assault which occurred on the
premises.'9 3 The court considered the condition of the complex and found that
the gate lock was unreliable and that the lessor kept a vacant apartment unlocked.
The court also noted that a prior assault had occurred in the same apartment
188. 695 P.2d 653 (Cal. 1985).
189. Id. at 655-58.
.190. Id. at 658.
191. Id. at 661-62.
192. 547 So. 2d 1075 (La. App. Ist Cir. 1989), writ denied, 584 So. 2d 678 (1991).
193. See supra text accompanying notes 62-63.
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building as the plaintiff.'94 In Phillips the court examined the condition of the
shopping center parking lot by asking if the lighting was adequate and if there were
any signs indicating the parking lot was patrolled. 95
The Willie court took an even more sophisticated approach. The plaintiff
suffered a severe gunshot injury after being abducted from a shopping center
parking lot.' 96 In determining the duty of the mall, the first circuit considered the
condition of the premises and found that the lighting was inferior in some areas of
the lot and there were no security measures in place. It reviewed the past
experience of the mall which indicated an abnormally high incidence of "crimes
against persons" on the premises. The court also considered the nature of this
particular mall and found evidence that there had been numerous complaints about
people consuming alcohol and illegal drugs on the premises.
97
The Willie court found support for its use of prior crimes from Phillips and
Harris, among others. For its consideration of the condition and nature of the
premises, the court adopted Section 344 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts as
authority."" Comment (f) to that section provides that a business owner may be
under a duty to take precautions against crime if the "place or character of his
business, or his past experience, is such that he should reasonably anticipate...
criminal conduct on the part of third persons."' 99 Finally, the court recognized
that other jurisdictions acknowledge the viability of a cause of action under
comment (f), citing Isaacs and several other cases from other jurisdictions.2 °°
C. Support for the Proposed Duty in Louisiana Law
Louisiana law, through its statutes and jurisprudence, provides authority for
courts who desire to employ the proposed approach. In Day, the fourth circuit
noted that the Louisiana law of torts as stated in Louisiana Civil Code article 2315
is very broad and used that notion to impose liability on the lessor.2", The
Louisiana Supreme Court has also indicated that Article 2315 calls on the courts to
employ a "traditional negligence analysis," meaning-the courts should examine the
particular facts in each case.20 2 More importantly, a traditional negligence
analysis means that a court's decision should not be controlled by the existence or
194. Day v. Castilow, 407 So. 2d 510, 511 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1981).
195. Phillips v. Equitable Life Assurance Co., 413 So. 2d 696, 698-700 (La. App. 4th Cir.), writ
denied, 420 So. 2d 164 (1982).
196. Willie v. American Casualty Co.. 547 So. 2d 1075, 1076 (La. App. Ist Cir. 1989), writ
denied, 584 So. 2d 678 (1991).
197. Id. at 1084.
198. Id. at 1081-82.
199. Restatement (Second) Torts § 344, comment f. (1965). The Louisiana Supreme Court
quoted this provision in dicta in Mundy, but failed to apply this provision in its analysis of the case.
See supra text accompanying notes 177-180.
200. Willie, 547 So. 2d at 1083.
201. Day v. Castilow, 407 So. 2d 510, 511 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1981).
202. See Cates v. Beauregard Electric Coop., Inc.. 328 So. 2d 367. 371 (La. 1976).
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non-existence of only one factor or a set of narrow factors, but instead the court's
decision should depend on as many different factors as are relevant to the particular
case.2 3 The proposed approach follows the courts' interpretation of Article 2315
in that it allows courts to consider many different factors in determining the
existence of a duty.
As referred to throughout this comment, there are three Louisiana cases which
have employed an approach similar to the one proposed: Day, Phillips, and Willie.
In addition, the recent case of Potter seems to suggest that the Louisiana Supreme
Court is broadening the factors it considers relevant to the issue of foreseeability
of criminal attacks.2 Although the overwhelming majority of the courts
continue to use either the "impending assault" or "prior crimes" rules, these cases
provide authority for courts desiring to use the proposed approach.
Finally, the duty/risk approach which the supreme court adopted in Hill also
provides support for the courts' use of the proposed approach because it encourages
courts to articulate and consider many different policies and factors. The duty/risk
approach allows the courts to engage in a discussion of administrative, ease of
association, economic, moral, and precedent or historical factors.0' In criminal
acts cases, courts should consider these factors along with those of the proposed
approach to establish a more demanding duty for the business owner, thereby
creating incentives for him to adopt precautionary measures against crime.
CONCLUSION
The pervasiveness of the crime problem, the inability of traditional law
enforcement to stem it, and the fact that commercial establishments are the hardest
hit by crime suggest that the law should impose a duty on the business owner to
take precautionary measures against crime. Louisiana courts should adopt a new
approach in determining the business owner's duty to guide him in the performance
of his duty. The courts should employ the traditional duty/risk analysis with a focus
on the nature, condition, location, and past experience of the business establish-
ment.
There is a tremendous need for Louisiana courts to abandon their traditional
approach to the business owner's duty, which is restricted to a narrow foreseeability
standard, for one which is sensitive to our changing society. There is a need
because innocent people's lives are being destroyed as they fall victim to crime.
If the business owner were to take precautionary measures according to the nature,
condition, location, and past experience of the business establishment, then perhaps
the number of criminal incidents would decrease. The courts should recognize the
203. Id. In Cates, the Louisiana Supreme Court repudiated the common law classifications of
invitee-trespasser-licensee, in favor of a traditional negligence analysis.
204. See supra text accompanying notes 104-107..
205. See generally Robertson supra, note 18, and Crowe, supra note 19.
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importance of such a policy and institute these new standards at their first
opportunity.
Suzanne Ciaccio
